Admiral Kuznetsov: Ultimate Guide to Russia’s Only Aircraft Carrier

The Admiral Kuznetsov: A Legacy of Ambition and Adversity

Introduction

The Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov is more than a warship; it is a physical artifact of a specific moment in history—a manifestation of late-Soviet naval ambition, post-Soviet industrial collapse, and the persistent, often painful, struggle of the modern Russian Federation to maintain the vestiges of global power.

Its history is a chronicle of design compromises, technical maladies, and operational misfortunes that offer profound insights into the state of the Russian Navy and its supporting industrial base.

Conceived in an era of superpower rivalry, born during the collapse of an empire, and plagued by a service life of near-constant trouble, the Kuznetsov stands as Russia’s sole, and often non-operational, aircraft carrier.

This report will provide a definitive, multi-layered analysis of the vessel, moving beyond a simple summary of its characteristics to dissect its doctrinal origins, technical realities, operational performance, and its ultimate, troubled significance.

It will argue that the ship’s fate is a bellwether for the future of Russia’s blue-water naval aspirations.

By examining its flawed conception, its unreliable machinery, its handicapped air wing, and its catastrophic service history, a clear picture emerges not of a formidable weapon of war, but of a deeply compromised platform whose story is a critical case study in the hollowing out of a once-great naval power.

The Cruiser with a Flight Deck: Genesis of Project 1143.5

The Admiral Kuznetsov was born from a deep-seated doctrinal conflict within the Soviet Navy. For decades, a debate raged between proponents of a true power-projection aircraft carrier, akin to those of the U.S. Navy, and a powerful faction that favored large, heavily armed missile cruisers and submarines as the core of Soviet naval might.

 The resulting vessel, Project 1143.5, was a deeply compromised hybrid of these two competing philosophies.

This compromise was enshrined in its official designation: Tyazholiy Avianesushchiy Kreyser (TAKR), or “Heavy Aircraft-Carrying Cruiser”.

 This classification was not merely semantic. It served a dual purpose that defined the ship’s design and destiny. Firstly, it accurately reflected the vessel’s immense indigenous firepower, distinguishing it from Western carriers which are almost exclusively mobile airbases. Secondly, and more pragmatically, it provided a legal loophole to transit the Turkish Straits. The 1936 Montreux Convention restricts the passage of aircraft carriers through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, but as a “cruiser,” the Soviet vessel could legally pass from its construction yard in the Black Sea to its designated homeport with the Northern Fleet.

The Catapult Failure and STOBAR Compromise

A critical turning point in the ship’s development was the failure of Soviet industry to master the complex technology of steam catapults. Despite attempts to develop a system, partly based on reverse-engineering components from the ex-British carrier Vikrant operated by India, a reliable design could not be produced.

 This technological shortfall forced the designers to abandon the CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) concept and adopt a STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) configuration. This involved fitting the carrier with a prominent 12-degree ski-jump at the bow to assist aircraft in becoming airborne.

While a functional alternative, this decision would permanently handicap the carrier’s air wing, a fundamental limitation that would shadow its entire operational life.

A Child of Two Nations

The carrier was laid down, initially as the Riga, on September 1, 1982, at the Nikolayev South Shipyard (also known as the Black Sea Shipyard) in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This shipyard was the sole manufacturer of all Soviet aircraft carriers, a concentration of industrial capacity that would have profound future consequences.

 The vessel’s name changed multiple times, reflecting the political turmoil of the era: launched as Leonid Brezhnev in 1985, it was renamed Tbilisi during its initial trials before finally being christened Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov on October 4, 1990, as anti-Soviet sentiment grew in Georgia.

The ship was officially commissioned into the Soviet Navy in January 1991, just months before the union dissolved.

 In the chaotic aftermath, the newly independent Russia hastily arranged for the not-yet-fully-operational carrier to sail from the Black Sea to join the Northern Fleet to secure it from being claimed by Ukraine. Its unfinished sister ship,

Varyag, was left behind in Nikolayev, eventually being sold to China and becoming the PLAN’s first carrier, the Liaoning.

The Admiral Kuznetsov would not become fully operational in the Russian Navy until 1995, by which time the economic and industrial system that built it had ceased to exist.

The decision to arm the Kuznetsov with twelve massive P-700 Granit (NATO: SS-N-19 Shipwreck) anti-ship cruise missiles, housed in vertical launch silos recessed into the deck beneath the ski-jump, was not merely a bonus feature.

It was a doctrinal hedge that speaks volumes about the Soviet Navy’s fundamental lack of confidence in carrier aviation as a standalone power-projection tool. Unlike Western carriers, which are pure mobile airbases that rely entirely on their air wing and escorts for offense and defense, the Soviets built the Kuznetsov to be capable of fighting a major surface engagement on its own terms. This “cruiser first, carrier second” philosophy, however, had a direct and deleterious consequence on its primary mission.

The enormous missile silos and their associated magazines occupied a vast amount of critical internal volume that, in a dedicated carrier design, would have been allocated to a larger hangar, more aviation fuel storage, or more extensive aircraft maintenance facilities. This design choice directly and permanently limited its efficiency as an aviation platform, baking profound limitations into the ship’s very structure from its conception.

Anatomy of a Hybrid Warship: Technical Analysis

A clinical assessment of the Admiral Kuznetsov’s hardware reveals a platform of stark contrasts: one armed with a formidable array of cruiser-like weaponry, yet powered by a notoriously unreliable heart and equipped with systems that reflect its troubled genesis.

Platform and Propulsion: The Smoky, Unreliable Heart

The Kuznetsov’s propulsion system has become its most infamous feature, a source of operational embarrassment and a primary driver of its chronic unavailability. The ship is powered by a conventional steam plant, eschewing the nuclear power used by American supercarriers. This plant consists of eight turbo-pressurized boilers that feed four TV-12-4 geared steam turbines, generating a total of 200,000 shaft horsepower (150 MW) to drive four fixed-pitch propellers.

This system gives the ship a designed top speed of 29 knots (54 km/h).

The root of the system’s problems lies in its fuel: “mazut,” a low-grade, viscous, tar-like heavy fuel oil.

This fuel, largely obsolete in naval use by the time the carrier was designed, is inefficient and difficult to work with. The ship’s propulsion system has been plagued by breakdowns stemming from shoddy pipework, defective boilers, and the sheer complexity of the high-pressure steam plant.

These issues culminated in a complete power loss off the coast of Syria in 2012, which required the flagship to be ignominiously towed thousands of miles back to its homeport.

Since then, the carrier has been routinely accompanied by a large ocean-going tug on all deployments as a standard precaution.

The iconic trail of thick, black smoke that follows the ship is a direct visual manifestation of this system’s inefficiency. It is caused by incomplete combustion, likely resulting from a failure to properly and consistently preheat the viscous mazut fuel before it is injected into the boilers.

The propulsion problems are not just a technical footnote; they are a direct and ongoing consequence of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. The specialized industrial expertise for manufacturing and maintaining its complex boiler system was primarily located in the Ukrainian SSR.

 After 1991, the Russian Navy lost reliable access to the original manufacturers and the deep institutional knowledge required for proper maintenance, repair, and production of key components. The subsequent history of breakdowns, flawed repairs, and the infamous smoke is a physical manifestation of this critical industrial rupture. The initial decision to use mazut, a fuel already being phased out by Western navies in the 1970s, further points to a system under strain, prioritizing expediency and reliance on older, domestically available technologies over long-term reliability. The carrier’s engine room is thus a case study in the immense difficulty of sustaining complex legacy military hardware after the industrial and logistical chains that created it have been irrevocably broken. This single point of failure has defined the ship’s entire operational life, turning a symbol of power into a byword for unreliability.

Table 1: Admiral Kuznetsov – Key Specifications and Propulsion Data

Characteristic	Specification
Full Load Displacement	58,600 – 61,390 tons
Length Overall	305 m (1,000 ft 8 in)
Beam Overall	72 m (236 ft 3 in)
Draft	10 m (32 ft 10 in)
Propulsion System	8x KVG-4 turbo-pressurized boilers, 4x TV-12 geared steam turbines
Total Power	200,000 shp (150 MW)
Top Speed	29 knots (54 km/h; 33 mph)
Range	8,500 nmi (15,700 km) at 18 knots
Crew Complement	~1,690 ship’s crew + ~626 air group

The “Cruiser” Armament: A Floating Missile Fortress

True to its “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser” designation, the Kuznetsov is armed with a density of firepower unseen on any other carrier in the world.

Primary Anti-Ship Battery: The ship’s most unique and powerful armament was its main battery of twelve P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) anti-ship cruise missiles.

These formidable, 7-ton supersonic missiles have a range reported to be between 400 km and 625 km and are capable of carrying either a massive 750 kg conventional warhead or a tactical nuclear payload.

They were intended to give the carrier the ability to engage and destroy an enemy carrier battle group on its own.

Layered Air Defense: The ship is protected by a dense, multi-layered air defense network designed for self-sufficiency.

Long-Range: The primary air defense system is the 3K95 Kinzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet). The ship is fitted with 24 vertical launch system modules, each holding eight missiles, for a total of 192 ready-to-fire SAMs.

The system can engage up to four targets simultaneously and has a range of up to 15 km.

Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS): For terminal defense against sea-skimming missiles and aircraft that penetrate the outer layers, the Kuznetsov is equipped with a combination of eight CADS-N-1 Kashtan (also known as Kortik) gun/missile systems and six AK-630 30mm Gatling guns.

The Kashtan system combines twin 30mm cannons with short-range surface-to-air missiles on a single mount.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): To counter underwater threats, the ship is fitted with the RBU-12000 UDAV-1 anti-submarine and anti-torpedo rocket system, which can fire depth charges and decoy projectiles.

Sensors and Electronics

The carrier’s sensor suite reflects its late-Soviet design era. It includes a Mars-Passat (“Sky Watch”) phased-array radar for air and surface search, supplemented by a Fregat-MA/Top Plate 3D air search radar. It is also equipped with various fire-control radars for its weapon systems, navigation radars, and a hull-mounted MGK-345 “Bronza” (Ox Yoke) sonar suite for detecting submarines and incoming torpedoes.

Table 2: Admiral Kuznetsov – Integrated Armament and Sensor Suite

System Type	System Name (NATO Reporting Name)	Details / Quantity
Anti-Ship Missile	P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)	12x VLS launchers
Long-Range SAM	3K95 Kinzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet)	24x 8-cell VLS (192 missiles)
CIWS (Gun/Missile)	CADS-N-1 Kashtan/Kortik	8x mounts
CIWS (Gun)	AK-630M	6x 30mm Gatling guns
Anti-Submarine Rocket	RBU-12000 UDAV-1	2x launchers (60 rockets)
Main Air Search Radar	MR-750 Fregat-MA (Top Plate)	3D Long-Range Search
Surface Search Radar	MR-320 Topaz (Strut Pair)	2D Air/Surface Search
Hull-Mounted Sonar	MGK-345 Bronza (Ox Yoke)	Medium/Low Frequency Search & Attack

The Air Wing: Capabilities and Constraints

The primary purpose of an aircraft carrier is the projection of air power. However, the Admiral Kuznetsov’s air wing has been consistently hampered by the ship’s design flaws, its operational unreliability, and a persistent deficit in pilot training.

The Flanker vs. the Fulcrum

The carrier’s fixed-wing component is a mix of heavy and medium fighters, reflecting an evolution in Russian naval aviation doctrine.

• Sukhoi Su-33 (Flanker-D): The original primary aircraft for the Kuznetsov, the Su-33 is a navalized variant of the formidable Su-27 Flanker air superiority fighter. It is a large, powerful aircraft with excellent maneuverability and range (in its land-based configuration). However, its production run was limited to just a few dozen airframes, and its initial design was almost purely for air-to-air combat. For its 2016 combat deployment, the Su-33s were upgraded with the SVP-24 specialized computing subsystem, giving them a limited ability to deliver unguided bombs with improved accuracy.
• Mikoyan MiG-29K (Fulcrum-D): Developed in parallel with the Su-33 but initially passed over, the MiG-29K program was revived to provide a more modern, truly multirole fighter for the Russian and Indian navies. The MiG-29K is smaller and lighter than the Su-33, making it better suited for ski-jump operations. It possesses a far more capable suite of air-to-ground precision weapons. However, the type has been plagued by reports of poor reliability and low serviceability rates, particularly with its engines.
• Helicopters: The air wing is rounded out by a complement of Kamov helicopters. The Ka-27 (Helix) is used for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and search and rescue (SAR), while the Ka-31 (Helix-B) provides a limited airborne early warning (AEW) capability.

The STOBAR Handicap

The carrier’s single greatest operational constraint is its STOBAR launch and recovery system. The 12-degree ski-jump does not impart significant kinetic energy to the aircraft during takeoff, unlike a steam or electromagnetic catapult.

This means that aircraft must rely entirely on their own engine power, using full afterburner, to achieve a safe flying speed as they leave the deck.

This physical limitation has a critical consequence: it severely restricts the maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of the aircraft. As a result, Su-33s and MiG-29Ks launching from the Kuznetsov cannot carry a full load of both fuel and weapons. They are forced to trade one for the other, drastically reducing either their combat radius or their weapon payload compared to their land-based or catapult-launched counterparts.

This was a key factor in the decision to relocate a portion of the air wing to a land base during the Syrian deployment, from which they could operate with a full combat load.

The Human Factor: A Perishable Skillset

Carrier aviation is an exceptionally demanding and perishable skill. The Kuznetsov’s long and frequent periods of inactivity and repair have made it nearly impossible for the Russian Navy to build and maintain a sufficient cadre of experienced, currently-qualified carrier pilots.

Pilots require constant and consistent practice to remain proficient in the dangerous tasks of carrier takeoffs and landings. While Russia operates the NITKA land-based training facility in occupied Crimea, which simulates a carrier deck with a ski-jump and arresting gear, it cannot fully replicate the dynamic conditions of a pitching and rolling ship at sea.

Reports from 2024 indicate that with the previous generation of Soviet-trained carrier pilots having largely retired during the ship’s long refit, the navy has been forced to train new pilots from scratch—a lengthy, expensive, and difficult process.

The combination of the STOBAR handicap and the pilot proficiency gap creates a vicious, self-defeating cycle. The ski-jump limits the aircraft’s effectiveness, making each sortie less impactful than it could be. Simultaneously, the ship’s own mechanical unreliability prevents the consistent, high-tempo operations needed to train and sustain a skilled corps of pilots. This was starkly and tragically demonstrated during the Syrian deployment. The two non-combat aircraft losses were not due to launch problems, but to catastrophic failures of the arresting gear—the other, equally critical, half of the STOBAR equation.

The inability to safely and reliably recover aircraft is just as crippling as the inability to launch them effectively.

This reality means Kuznetsov’s air wing is, in many ways, a capability that defeats itself. It is too small and too constrained by its launch and recovery system to be a decisive power projection tool, and the ship itself is too unreliable to serve as an effective training platform. This renders its primary function largely symbolic rather than practical.

Table 3: Admiral Kuznetsov – Air Wing Composition and Roles

Aircraft	Type	Primary Role	Key Operational Constraints from Carrier
Sukhoi Su-33 (Flanker-D)	Heavy Air Superiority Fighter	Fleet Air Defense, Escort	Limited payload/range due to STOBAR; limited ground-attack capability
Mikoyan MiG-29K/KUB (Fulcrum-D)	Multirole Fighter	Air-to-Ground Strike, Anti-Ship, Air Defense	Better A/G weapons but poor serviceability rates; still limited by STOBAR
Kamov Ka-27 (Helix)	Naval Helicopter	Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Search & Rescue (SAR)	Standard helicopter operations
Kamov Ka-31 (Helix-B)	Naval Helicopter	Airborne Early Warning (AEW)	Limited endurance and radar capability compared to fixed-wing AWACS aircraft

Trial by Fire and Water: A Troubled Service History

The operational life of the Admiral Kuznetsov has been a chronicle of technical failures, accidents, and deployments that often highlighted its weaknesses more than its strengths. Its service history is defined less by combat glory and more by a persistent struggle against its own inherent flaws.

The Syrian Combat Debut (2016-2017): Propaganda vs. Reality

In late 2016, the Kuznetsov battle group deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean in the carrier’s first and only combat tour. The mission was intended to support Russian military operations in Syria and serve as a high-profile demonstration of Russian naval power.

The reality of the deployment, however, fell far short of the propaganda.

The Russian Ministry of Defense made bold claims, stating the carrier’s air wing conducted 420 combat sorties and destroyed over 1,000 targets. These figures were widely disputed by independent Western analysts, who estimated the actual number of sorties was much lower, likely closer to 150.

The inherent limitations of launching from the ski-jump quickly became apparent. To conduct more effective strikes with heavier weapon loads, a significant portion of the carrier’s air wing—including Su-33s—was relocated ashore to the Russian-controlled Khmeimim Air Base in Syria.

The deployment was most notoriously marred by the loss of two aircraft in non-combat incidents, both stemming from failures of the ship’s arresting gear system:

-November 14, 2016: A MiG-29K crashed into the Mediterranean. It had been holding in a circling pattern after a sortie, but a cable on the arresting gear system broke during another aircraft’s landing. While the crew on deck scrambled to repair the wire, the MiG-29K ran out of fuel and its engines failed before it could be diverted to land ashore.

-December 3, 2016: An Su-33 attempting to land on the carrier also crashed into the sea. The aircraft’s hook successfully caught an arresting wire, but the cable snapped under the strain, and the aircraft was unable to accelerate fast enough to go around for another attempt.

In both cases, the pilots ejected safely and were recovered. These incidents exposed a catastrophic level of unreliability in the ship’s most critical aviation system, alongside questionable flight deck management and decision-making. The deployment, intended as a show of force, was instead met with ridicule in the West, with one UK official dubbing it Moscow’s “ship of shame”.

A Cursed Refit (2017-Present): A Cascade of Failures

Following its troubled Syrian tour, the Kuznetsov entered the 35th Ship Repair Plant in Murmansk in 2017 for a planned major overhaul and modernization intended to extend its service life by another 25 years.

This refit has since descended into a litany of disasters, underscoring the decay of Russia’s heavy industrial infrastructure.

-October 30, 2018: The Sinking of PD-50. In a stunning industrial accident, the floating drydock PD-50—the largest in Russia and the only one in the region capable of accommodating the carrier—suffered a power failure and sank while the Kuznetsov was aboard. As the dock went down, one of its 70-ton cranes collapsed onto the carrier’s flight deck, punching a large hole measuring approximately 19 square meters (200 sq ft). One worker was killed and four were injured in the incident.

-December 12, 2019: The First Major Fire. With the carrier moored pier-side and repairs continuing under difficult conditions, a major fire broke out. Welding sparks reportedly ignited spilled fuel in a power unit space. The blaze spread through internal cabling, resulting in the deaths of two people and injuring more than a dozen from fire and smoke inhalation. The damage was initially estimated at around $8 million, though later official estimates lowered the figure.

-December 22, 2022: The Second Fire. As the ship was being prepared to leave a newly constructed, and improvised, graving dock, another fire broke out. While officials claimed it was a “small fire” that was quickly extinguished with no casualties, it required the evacuation of 20 personnel and served as another stark reminder of the project’s hazardous nature.

This cascade of accidents, compounded by persistent reports of funding embezzlement and corruption within the United Shipbuilding Corporation, has led to repeated, multi-year delays. The carrier’s promised return to service has slipped continuously, from an initial target of 2021 to 2023, then to the first quarter of 2024, and now is not expected before 2025 at the earliest, with some assessments suggesting even later dates.

It is tempting to view the sinking of PD-50 and the recurring fires as isolated, unfortunate events. A deeper analysis, however, reveals them to be symptoms of a systemic disease: the profound decay of Russia’s heavy industrial base and its associated safety culture. The loss of the PD-50 was not merely an accident; it was the loss of a unique and critical piece of national strategic infrastructure that Russia has proven unable to replace, forcing it to undertake a massive, time-consuming project to expand a land-based graving dock instead.

The repeated fires point to a fundamental breakdown in basic industrial safety protocols, likely exacerbated by a less-skilled workforce, aging equipment, and immense pressure from the Kremlin to meet unrealistic deadlines. The persistent allegations of corruption suggest that funds intended for critical repairs and modernization may have been siphoned off, further degrading the quality of work, materials, and oversight.

This pattern demonstrates that Russia’s problems are not merely financial; they are deeply structural. The country currently appears to lack the requisite combination of modern infrastructure, skilled labor, and disciplined project management to execute a warship modernization project of this scale and complexity without suffering catastrophic setbacks.

Table 4: Timeline of Major Accidents and Refit Delays (2017-Present)

Date	Event	Impact
2017	Start of Overhaul	Admiral Kuznetsov enters the 35th Ship Repair Plant in Murmansk for a multi-year refit and modernization.
Oct 30, 2018	Sinking of PD-50 Drydock	The floating drydock PD-50 sinks. A 70-ton crane collapses onto the flight deck, causing significant damage and killing one worker.
Dec 12, 2019	Major Fire Onboard	A fire breaks out during welding, killing two people, injuring over a dozen, and causing millions of dollars in damage.
Dec 22, 2022	Second Fire Onboard	Another fire occurs while the ship is in its new graving dock, requiring evacuation but reportedly causing no casualties.
2021-2025+	Chronic Delays	The initial return-to-service date of 2021 is repeatedly pushed back due to accidents, discovery of new defects, and other setbacks. The date slips to 2023, then 2024, and is now projected for 2025 or later.

Strategic Analysis: Symbol, Liability, and the Future of Russian Naval Power

In the final analysis, the Admiral Kuznetsov must be assessed not only on its technical merits but on its strategic value to the Russian Federation.

Decades after its commissioning, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the carrier has transitioned from a flawed but potent symbol of naval ambition into a profound strategic liability. Its troubled history and uncertain future serve as a powerful barometer for the trajectory of the entire Russian surface fleet.

An Asset of Diminishing Returns

The immense resources expended on the Kuznetsov’s seemingly endless refit represent a massive opportunity cost for a navy facing significant financial constraints. The funds poured into patching up the aging, unreliable hull could have been directed toward more modern, effective, and strategically relevant platforms, such as the new Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates armed with hypersonic Zircon missiles, or the highly capable Yasen-class nuclear submarines.

The carrier’s value as an instrument of national prestige has also been severely tarnished by its operational failures, the embarrassing smoke trail, and the international ridicule it endured during its Syrian deployment.

Most critically, the ship’s material condition has reportedly deteriorated to a perilous state. During the current refit, ship repairmen allegedly discovered such significant corrosion in the structural members below the third deck that they warned the military the vessel was at high risk of sinking or capsizing if it were to be deployed to sea.

This elevates the ship from a mere operational headache to a potential maritime disaster, a liability that could cost lives and deliver a devastating blow to national pride.

The End of the Blue-Water Dream?

The fate of the Admiral Kuznetsov is inextricably linked to the broader trajectory of the Russian Navy. Expert analysis, particularly from institutions like the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), concludes that Russia’s surface fleet is in a state of managed decline, devolving from the blue-water, ocean-going force of the Soviet era into a “green-water” fleet designed primarily for operations in littoral zones close to Russian shores.

This fleet will be based around smaller, but still potent, frigates and corvettes.

The Russian shipbuilding industry has demonstrated a clear inability to construct new large surface combatants. This is evidenced by the severe delays in even the smaller frigate programs and the ultimate suspension of the ambitious Project 23560 Lider-class nuclear-powered destroyer, which has been effectively cancelled.42 In this context, ambitious concepts for a future Russian supercarrier, such as the nuclear-powered “Shtorm” project, appear entirely fantastical. Russia currently possesses neither the industrial capacity, the specialized shipyards (the only one being in Mykolaiv, Ukraine), nor the financial resources to undertake such a monumental project, especially when it cannot successfully refit its single existing carrier.

Conclusion and Final Assessment

The Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov is a relic of a bygone era, a ship born of a superpower in its twilight and inherited by a successor state that has proven incapable of properly maintaining it. Its story is not one of combat glory, but of a persistent and losing battle against industrial decay, technical obsolescence, and operational reality.

While Moscow’s political leadership may yet succeed in forcing the ship back into some form of limited, highly escorted service, it will remain a floating museum of unfulfilled potential. It is a powerful symbol, but not of naval might; rather, it symbolizes the immense challenge Russia faces in sustaining the complex technological legacy of its Soviet past in the face of 21st-century economic and industrial realities.

Its most enduring value to history will likely not be as a warship, but as a critical and cautionary case study for naval historians and strategic analysts on the hollowing out of a once-great naval power.

About the Author: Harry J. Kazianis

Harry J. Kazianis (@Grecianformula) is a national security expert based in Orlando, Florida. Kazianis was Senior Director of National Security Affairs at the Center for the National Interest (CFTNI), a foreign policy think tank founded by Richard Nixon, based in Washington, DC. He also served as Executive Editor of its publishing arm, The National Interest. Harry has over a decade of experience in think tanks and national security publishing. His ideas have been published in the NY Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, CNN, and many other outlets worldwide. He has held positions at CSIS, the Heritage Foundation, the University of Nottingham, and several other institutions related to national security research and studies.