In early August 2025 the United States brokered a peace agreement between long-standing rivals Armenia and Azerbaijan, bringing about a halt to decades of conflict and laying the groundwork for a new infrastructure corridor that could reshape regional connectivity and trade. Its realisation is far from certain, however, with several hurdles yet to be overcome.
A shift in diplomacy brings a regional breakthrough
In the White House on 8 August 2025 US President Donald Trump oversaw what his team presented to the assembled media as “the biggest foreign policy win of the century”. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev initialled (though did not sign) a peace agreement promising to end more than three decades of tension, mistrust and open conflict.
The agreement not only seeks to end hostilities between the neighbouring countries, it unveiled the so-called Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) in a separate agreement (that was actually signed). The deal sets the stage for a multi-modal infrastructure ‘corridor’ through Armenia’s southeastern Syunik province, parallel to the Aras/Arax River, which marks the border with Iran. Revealed as a “bridge for trade and peace”, TRIPP represents a strategically dramatic development resonating way beyond the region.
TRIPP: beyond symbolism?
TRIPP’s physical footprint is ambitious: a 44 km secure transport and energy corridor connecting Azerbaijan proper to its autonomous exclave, Nakhchivan, thereby allowing land access to Türkiye’s extreme southeastern border. According to reports, it will carry:
- Dual-track rail lines (envisaged for freight and passengers);
- High-voltage electricity lines;
- An oil and gas pipeline;
- Fibre-optic cables.
Under the agreement the transport corridor will be overseen by a US-led public/private consortium with a 99-year development lease, protecting it from unilateral closure by either Armenia or Azerbaijan. For Baku, it is primarily all about the long-dreamed of Zangezur Corridor connecting Azerbaijan proper to Türkiye. For Yerevan, on the other hand, it represents an uncomfortable concession made more palatable only with guarantees of customs revenue, jobs and US investment in the planned free economic zones.
Demise of old-school diplomacy: the OSCE Minsk Group
The OSCE Minsk Group is dead in the water, replaced overnight by a new project linking peace in the region to infrastructure and commercial deals.
Since March 1992 the OSCE Minsk Group – a grouping of 13 states from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, co-chaired until recently by the US (somewhat ironically), Russia and France – was tasked with brokering a peace deal in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite very occasional moments of hope, ultimately it achieved little. For its part, Russia used its position to steer the format to maintain its regional, historical dominance; France primarily projected moral arguments related to human displacement, while the US maintained a low-profile/low-risk engagement in what has traditionally been an unfamiliar region.
However, the wars in and around Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2023 destroyed the Minsk framework’s credibility; it was kept alive only thanks to the decision-making deadlock within the OSCE. On 19 September 2023 Azerbaijan retook the enclave in a 24-hour ‘blitzkrieg’ offensive, leading to the exodus of virtually all 100,000 ethnic Armenians to Armenia proper. Russia’s so-called peacekeepers (deployed since the end of the short-lived hostilities in 2020) watched on silently as the operation unfolded. The Minsk Group also went silent.
The final nail in the coffin for the OSCE came with the formal closure of the Minsk Group and its Special Representative’s position on 1 September 2025 with a ministerial decision taken unanimously (consensus-based) by the 57 OSCE states. All associated administrative tasks are to be closed by 1 December 2025.
In light of the recent turbulent past, Trump’s White House display is more than a new chapter; it is a complete rewriting of the traditional multilateral approach. The US, once an equal partner in the OSCE Minsk process, has acted unilaterally and with determination, sidelining OSCE partners Russia and France but also the European Union’s Eastern Partnership, which includes both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Russia: an irrelevant bystander? Not quite
For decades Russia has been the essential power in the South Caucasus region. Indeed, Moscow’s strong military presence in Armenia remains a cornerstone of their bilateral security relationship, though it faces challenges amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. Its 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, western Armenia, established in 1995, is still the largest Russian facility in the South Caucasus, comprising around 5,000 personnel equipped with MiG-29 fighters and S-300 air defence systems. The base operates under a bilateral agreement extended until 2044 and also houses the joint Armenia-Russia United Group of Forces. Additionally, about 4,500 Russian border guards from the Federal Security Service (FSB) are still stationed at posts along Armenia’s borders with Türkiye and Iran.
To recall, Armenia belongs to the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union: a bloc of five post-Soviet states bound by obligations related to a unified customs area, which include overseeing transit operations across its territory.
While Russia’s initial response to the newly proposed corridor was guardedly supportive, subsequent statements by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova warned against outside influence, reminding that, for Russia, “The most suitable option to resolve the problems in the South Caucasus is to search for and implement solutions developed by the region’s countries themselves, with support from their direct neighbours: Russia, Iran and Türkiye.” With the US-brokered agreement, many observers believe Russia has been dealt a blow to its once exclusive great power role in the region.
Iran: an alarmed neighbour
Iran reacted initially to the agreement with predictable vitriol. In an article titled ‘Aliyev and Pashinyan on Zelenskyy’s Road to Misery’, the political deputy of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, Yadollah Javani, compared the moves to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s invitation to NATO into what Russia considers its traditional security sphere in Eastern Europe: something Javani further argued had triggered Moscow’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In a more measured response the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated, “The Islamic Republic expresses concern over the negative consequences of any form of foreign intervention, especially near its shared borders, that could undermine the security and lasting stability of the region.”
For Tehran, TRIPP represents three strategic losses:
- Iranian transit routes are bypassed: until now, Armenia’s access to global markets has partly relied on routes through Iran to its deep-water ports;
- The Türkiye–Azerbaijan axis is reinforced: Iran has long been distrustful of Ankara and Baku’s ‘one nation, two states’ approach. The new agreement boosts this Turkic alliance with an uninterrupted and long-sought after land route;
- Internal ethnic tensions are aggravated: Iran’s northwest is home to as many as 20 million ethnic Azeris; Tehran fears that a territorially connected Azerbaijan could fuel cross-border nationalist sentiment under the banner of Pan-Turkism. Further exacerbating the dynamic is Tehran’s long-lasting mistrust of Azerbaijan’s staunchly secular orientation.
Türkiye: a big winner
With Azerbaijan the obvious beneficiary, Türkiye may well be the most strategically advantaged player in the wider sense. Ankara’s goal of securing a ‘Middle Corridor’ – connecting Türkiye to Central Asia and China via the South Caucasus – may finally be realised.
Ankara benefits by gaining:
- Direct land access to Baku without routing via Georgia;
- Increased leverage in Central Asian energy projects;
- A key role as a node in Europe–Asia freight and energy flows.
Ankara has welcomed the peace agreement, with the Turkish Foreign Ministry praising the deal, labelling it “an extremely important development in terms of ensuring regional peace and stability”. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan referred to the proposed corridor as a “strategic breakthrough”. In short, Türkiye views the deal as improving regional connectivity, linking Europe with Asia via Türkiye. Furthermore, it will not be long before Turkish contractors are active in seeking TRIPP-related contracts.
Potential constitutional issues in Armenia
One key hurdle the deal must overcome is the requirement for Armenia to amend its constitution by removing text that enshrines Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Armenia’s national identity. However, this can only be achieved through a two-thirds parliamentary majority (unlikely without opposition support) or a national referendum.
With parliamentary elections expected in June 2026, the opposition will present the constitutional amendment as nothing less than capitulation. The domestic political process in the coming months will face challenges before the deal is formally ratified.
The human cost: the displaced of Nagorno-Karabakh
Moreover, the human cost should be kept in mind; as many as 99% of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population fled as a result of the 2023 Azeri military offensive, meaning the human dimension is still very raw, but, thanks to a special government employment programme, as of December 2024 over 21,800 displaced individuals secured employment, with nearly 5,000 opening businesses or registering as self-employed.
However, for these displaced communities, scattered throughout Armenia, TRIPP is not seen as a symbol of peace but instead one of betrayal. The agreement’s constitutional requirement – to remove Yerevan’s formal claim on Nagorno-Karabakh – only rubs salt into the wound. With the June 2026 elections, these displaced Karabakh Armenians will undoubtedly be a political force in the coming months.
Europe’s shifting role
The EU deployed a monitoring mission to Armenia (EUMA) in 2023, mandated to conduct unarmed, civilian monitoring along Armenia’s borders to reduce tensions, build confidence and report on security developments. The EU could be facing a reduced role as Washington’s direct engagement in this region means Brussels’ political influence is potentially diminished. The EU’s challenge will be how to remain relevant as a political actor. If it retreats to being only a customer for energy flows, its influence in the South Caucasus will shrink.
However, in energy terms Europe potentially stands to gain significantly:
- Gas diversification: Azerbaijan’s pipeline exports to Europe – currently via Georgia and Türkiye – could expand through TRIPP’s infrastructure;
- Electricity imports: plans are already being floated for high-voltage connections to feed renewable energy from the Caspian into European grids;
- Digital transit: TRIPP’s fibre optics could link European and Asian data markets, bypassing Russian and Iranian infrastructure.
Winners and losers
Winners:
- Azerbaijan: gains a secure land link to Türkiye.
- Türkiye: gains a land corridor to Central Asia.
- The US: secures a foreign policy win over both Russia and the EU.
Losers:
- Russia: relegated to a secondary player in its former sphere of influence.
- Iran: faces reduced leverage regionally and potential internal unrest.
- Armenian opposition: constitutional amendment seen as surrender.
- EU status: marginalised from peace-making in its Eastern neighbourhood.
Next steps and outlook
Since the agreement was signed, implementation of the corridor is moving cautiously ahead.
In mid-August 2025 Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to assure Tehran that the land corridor would continue to be under Yerevan’s security control and sovereignty, which sought to ease Iranian anxiety over foreign (ergo US) influence along its northern border.
Throughout August and September both sides noted their readiness to move forward, with Baku confirming that implementation within Armenian territory had been agreed and that Armenia would collect transit fees. For its part, Yerevan has continued to present the proposed corridor as a new, co-operative route, not in any way as a concession of territory.
Of note, though details are still thin, a US delegation was in Yerevan in mid-September, apparently signalling the beginning of the project’s implementation at the operational level. According to media, discussions focused more on technical details and possible construction timelines, highlighting a degree of momentum despite the abovementioned challenges.
Conclusion – uncertain peace
For all the pomp of White House fanfare, this agreement still lies on uncertain ground. Armenia’s likely constitutional difficulties and Iran’s potential hostility, coupled with reduced US Administration attention, might reduce Washington’s commitment to see it through. Nevertheless, TRIPP could still bring the South Caucasus into a more co-operative economic space, but it could just as easily become a new flashpoint for influence and rivalry.
The regional implications are already evident: Central Asia can consider fresh links westwards, Türkiye firms up its goal of a ‘Middle Corridor’, Russia will look to reassert its influence, and the EU will strive to turn energy access into political leverage. Whether TRIPP becomes a real bridge to durable stability or trigger further tension in a traditionally volatile region will depend less on the US and more on the fluctuating politics of the region.
